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Since the end of World War II there has been a proliferation
of international organizations. In 1975, there were at least eighty-
three international organizations operating throughout the world.'
The rights, duties and place of these organizations in international
and municipal law are uncertain. Prior to the appearance of inter-
national organizations, international law as well as the domestic
law of most states, had not been forced to differentiate between the
legal concepts of international personality and national sover-
eignty. Consequently, international usage has blended these two
legal concepts without demarcation. A separation of the two con-
cepts is now necessary, particularly with the advent of the economi-
cally motivated international organization, 2 as contrasted with the
public welfare organization.' Many of the economically motivated
international organizations, such as the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), are capable of exerting, and do in
fact exert, tremendous economic pressure on the international com-
munity, even to the point of threatening sovereignty.
In the absence of an effective international forum the only way
to check the powers of these international organizations and adju-
dicate disputes is to resort to municipal courts and municipal law.
But municipal law, like international law, is not prepared to deal
with international organizations.' International organizations are
* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School; LL.M., 1977, J.D., 1977,
M.A., 1968, B.A., 1967, University of Texas, Austin.
1. See D. BoWETT, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS xi-xiv (1975) for a list
of these international organizations.
2. For example, the European Economic Community, Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Andean Pact, and other free trade associations and common
markets.
3. For example, the United Nations and its specialized agencies such as World Food
Program (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Educational, Scien-
tific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF),
and United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA).
4. For example, suit was dismissed against OPEC for lack of jurisdiction in Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (D.C. Cal. 1979)[hereinaf-
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not sovereign states, corporations or persons. Whether an interna-
tional organization is capable of litigating its disputes within a mu-
nicipal forum depends on whether the laws of the applicable
sovereign accord the international organization "legal capacity."
This Article explores the amenability of international organi-
zations, particularly OPEC, to litigation in United States courts.
This inquiry will be preceded by the formulation of a concise defi-
nition of international legal personality and its attributes. In partic-
ular, the privileges and immunities afforded international
organizations by United States law will be delineated and ex-
amined. Once the international and domestic status of interna-
tional organizations has been established, the legal as well as the
practical difficulties encountered in acquiring jurisdiction will be
explored.
I. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY
Two distinct approaches have been used to determine whether
an organization created by States has legal personality.5 These two
approaches may be labeled the "inductive" approach and the "ob-
jective" approach. The inductive approach requires an inquiry into
the intent of the forming States by examining the evidence sur-
rounding the organization's formation. In practice, this approach
primarily involves examining the governing documents of the or-
ganization.6 Under the inductive approach, a search of the organi-
zation's governing documents is made for the attributes of
international legal personality, expressed or implied in those docu-
ments. From this it can be determined whether an international
organization possess international legal personality. The objective
approach does not inquire into the intent of the forming States as
expressed in the governing documents. Rather, this approach re-
quires an examination of the structure of the organization in the
light of the principles of international law.7
The objective approach to international legal personality was
ter cited as Int'l Ass'n of Machinists]. Moreover, the court thought that it would be impossi-
ble to acquire jurisdiction over OPEC. Id at 560.
5. See, e.g., D. BowEr, supra note 1, at 299-304. See I. BROWNLE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 520 (1966), for a discussion of the inductive approach. See for
example SEYERSTED, OBJECTIVE INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGA-
NIZATIONS (1963), for a discussion of the objective approach.
6. Rama-Montaldo, International LegalPersonality andlmpliedPowers of International
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utilized by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion
in Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Na-
tions8 There the Court set out four necessary preconditions for the
existence of international legal personality. First, the organization
must be created as more than a mere center for the harmonization
of States' actions in the attainment of common ends.9 This precon-
dition distinguishes between organizations such as the United Na-
tions and the British Commonwealth. Second, the organization
must be equipped with an infrastructure of its own. 10 A conference
or congress of states would not satisfy this precondition. Third,
special tasks must be assigned to the organization." Fourth, the
position of the organization vis a vis its members must be defined in
such a way as to give the organization a life of its own, detached
from that of its members.' 2 In other words, the organization must
be capable of expressing a will of its own, either by a power of
decision binding on members by majority vote or by the compe-
tence of the organization to exercise certain independent functions.
Once these four essential preconditions are met, international legal
personality will be established. Certain consequences will then fol-
low as a result of this determination.
The primary consequence of establishing that an organization
possess international legal personality is that such an organization
is deemed a subject of international law and capable of possessing
international rights and duties. ' The attributes of international le-
gal personality are generally conceded to be: (1) the power to make
treaties; (2) the attribution of privileges and immunities; (3) the
power to contract; and, (4) the power to undertake legal proceed-
ings.14 Despite the significance of these attributes, possessing inter-
national legal personality does not place an international
organization on the same legal plane as a sovereign.
1. The Inductive Approach. The application of the inductive ap-
proach to organizations of lesser magnitude than the United Na-
tions provides little more than a determination of legal personality
for municipal law purposes of the forming States. The existence of
8. 1949 I.C.J. 174.
9. Id. at 178.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 178-79.
13. Id. at 179.
14. D. BOWETT, supra note 1, at 302.
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legal personality in international law under the inductive approach
depends upon the acceptance of the legal personality of the organi-
zation by States not parties to the formation. 5 The acceptance of
legal personality in the municipal law of substantially all States
would certainly prove legal personality on the international plane.
At the same time, the absence of acceptance or the acceptance by
just a few States outside of the forming group would cast serious
doubt on the existence of international personality of an organiza-
tion. However, when an organization has international legal per-
sonality under the objective approach, it is an international person
and the recognition of that legal personality in the municipal law of
each State is immaterial. 6
In applying the inductive approach to determine whether
OPEC has international legal personality the starting point is the
Statute of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries."
7
Not surprisingly, the OPEC Statute does not refer to the Organiza-
tion's international status, although it is clear that the members cre-
ated an independent entity.' 8 With no express indication of
international legal personality in the OPEC Statute, an examina-
tion must be undertaken to determine whether OPEC possesses the
four attributes of international legal personality. The OPEC Stat-
ute is silent with respect to treaty making power, privileges and im-
munities, the power to contract, and the right to sue and be sued.
However, under the doctrine of "implied powers" the organization
possesses those powers and functions which, while not expressed,
are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to
the performance of its duties.19
Nothing in the OPEC Statute requires that a treaty-making
power be implied in order for OPEC to perform its functions and
duties. Nevertheless, pursuant to Article 5 of its Charter, OPEC
has entered into an agreement with Austria regarding OPEC's
15. Eg., Agreement on Judicial Status, Mar. 10, 1955, Switzerland-World Meterologi-
cal Association (WMO), 211 U.N.T.S. 278.
16. The United Nations as an international person had the legal capacity to make an
international claim for reparation for injuries even against a nonmember defendant State.
1949 I.C.J. 184-85.
17. Resolution VIII. 56 adopted at the Eighth Conference (Extraordinary) reprinted in,
4 I.L.M. 1175 (1965), held in Geneva Switzerland April 5-10, 1965.
18. Statute of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), art. 27(A),
reprinted in, 4 I.L.M. 1175, 1182 (1965), provides that the Secretary General shall be the
legally authorized representative of the organization [hereinafter cited as OPEC STATUTE].
19. 1949 I.C.J. 182.
Vol. 12
4
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2 [], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol12/iss2/4
OPEC - A CASE STUDY
headquarters. 20  Such an agreement is in fact a treaty. 2I Appar-
ently, OPEC has read into Article 5 an implied treaty-making
power. Within international legal analysis there is no better evi-
dence of what the forming States intended than their subsequent
actions through the organization.
Chapter III of the OPEC Statute provides for a Secretariat
22whose staff is to be exclusively of an international character. .
The staff is not to seek or accept instructions from any government
or outside authority and is charged with the execution of its duties
solely in the interest of the organization.23 Implicit in the creation
of a Secretariat with international employees is the privileges and
immunities normally granted to such employees.24
The power to contract is a necessary implied power of any or-
ganization which must establish a headquarters and create a secre-
tariat and a bureaucracy. In addition, real estate must be acquired,
supplies purchased, employees hired and services supplied if the
organization is to function. A necessary corollary of the power to
contract is the capacity to sue and be sued in order to enforce those
contracts. Moreover, the Enforcement Department of OPEC is
charged with the follow-up and implementation of resolutions and
recommendations made by the Conference which requires action
by the members and the Secretariat. 25 In order to enforce its reso-
lutions and recommendations, OPEC must implicitly have the
power to test the legality of its acts and their consequences; there-
fore, the capacity to sue and be sued is essential if OPEC is to fulfill
its functions and duties.
Under the inductive approach, OPEC has international legal
personality. There is no question that OPEC members accept the
20. Agreement Regarding the Headquarters of the Organization of the Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries, signed June 24, 1965, Austria-OPEC, 589 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter cited
as Headquarters Agreement].
21. A treaty is an agreement in written form governed by international law and con-
cluded between two or more States, or other subjects of international law possessed of treaty-
making capacity. Art. 2, Report of the International Law Commission to the General As-
sembly, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 9, U.N. Doc. A/4169 (1959), reprinted in, (1959) 2
Y.B. INT'L. L. COMM'N 87, 95, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.4/Add.l.
22. OPEC STATUTE, supra note 18, art. 32
23. Id.
24. Privileges and immunities normally accorded diplomatic and international employ-
ees include immunity from legal process unless waived, immunity from search of premises
and archives, currency and fiscal privileges such as transfer of funds free of fiscal controls
and regulations and exemption from direct taxation, and freedom of communication without
censorship. D. BOWETr, supra note 1, at 308-14.
25. OPEC STATUTE, supra note 18, art. 36(1).
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organization's international status. The primary concern is the ac-
ceptance of that status by nonmember states. Three nonmember
states with varying views on this issue are Austria, Switzerland and
the United States. Austria has expressly accepted OPEC's interna-
tional legal personality.26 Switzerland has tacitly accepted OPEC's
international status by allowing OPEC to operate within Switzer-
land from 1960 to 1965. The United States has not officially recog-
nized OPEC's international status. This uncertainty over OPEC's
international legal personality can be resolved if OPEC has inter-
national legal personality under the objective approach.27
2. The Objective Approach. In the Reparation Case28 the I.C.J.
enunciated four preconditons necessary to the existence of interna-
tional legal personality under the objective approach. The I.C.J.
held that an international organization is required to: (1) be more
than a center which coordinates State conduct; (2) possess an infra-
structure; (3) perform "special tasks;" and,(4) have a life of its own.
An analysis of OPEC under the objective approach shows that
these four criteria are satisfied, and that OPEC thus possess an in-
ternational legal personality.
The first criterion, that an international organization be a
center which coordinates State conduct, is easily satisfied. At its
inception OPEC was intended to be more than a conference of oil
ministers. OPEC's members not only set oil policies but they also
implement those policies. OPEC policies are not merely deter-
mined at conference meetings and then left to the individual mem-
bers to implement within their own territories.29 OPEC has
checked the power of the major oil companies and made the mem-
bers truly sovereign over their natural resources.30 The OPEC Spe-
cial Fund was established to assist nonmember Third World States
through the financing of balance of payment deficits, the financing
of specific development programs or projects and the lending of
money to international development agencies for the benefit of de-
veloping countries. Clearly, OPEC is more than a conference of oil
ministers and at least a coordinator of State conduct.
26. See Headquarters Agreement, supra note 20.
27. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
28. See supra note 8.
29. OPEC STATUTE, supra note 18, arts. 2, 15(l) & 36.
30. OPEC stabilized and then raised the "posted" or "tax-reference" oil prices which
had been unilaterally set by the oil companies prior to 1970. See OPEC Res. XXI.120 (Dec.
1970) reprinted in, 10 I.L.M. 240 (1971) [hereinafter cited as OPEC Res.).
Vol. 12
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OPEC's infrastructure satisfies the second precondition under
the objective approach. OPEC has three organs: The Conference,
the Board of Governors, and the Secretariat.
31
The third precondition to international legal personality under
the objective approach is that special tasks must be assigned to the
organization. Those special tasks are set out in Article 2 of the
OPEC Statute. The primary task of OPEC is the coordination and
unification of its members' petroleum policies. OPEC's secondary
task is to find ways and means of insuring stabilization of prices in
the international oil market. Incidentally, OPEC has been quite
successfull in accomplishing these tasks.32
The fourth and final preconditon to the possession of interna-
tional legal personality focuses on OPEC's capacity for expressing a
will of its own, independent from that of its member states.33 The
Secretariat staff is prohibited from seeking or accepting instructions
from any government and required to perform solely in the interest
of OPEC.34 The Conference acts only by unanimous vote3 5 which
makes determination of an independent will more difficult. How-
ever, other evidence of an independent will can be found. For ex-
ample, the Economics Department, 6  the Enforcement
Department, 3 the Public Relations Department 3 and the Techni-
cal Department, 39 all perform organizational functions for the ben-
efit of OPEC's members as a whole. As is sometimes the case, the
conclusions and recommendations made by these departments are
not in the best interest of a particular member. This willingness on
the part of OPEC's operational departments to run contrary to the
interests of individual members helps support the conclusion that
OPEC has a will of its own.
In conclusion, OPEC meets the four preconditons for interna-
31. OPEC STATUTE, mupra note 18, art. 9.
32. Stabilization was accomplished by means of OPEC Res. XXI.120 (Dec. 1970). See
OPEC Res., supra note 30. Unification of prices has been accomplished by the establishment
of a bench price for Saudi Arabian crude but variation in prices does occur as a result of spot
markets and dissension in the ranks. OPEC has drafted and urged adoption of uniform
petroleum laws. Declaratory Statement of Petroleum Policy in Member Countries, OPEC
Res. XV1.90 (June 1968), reprinledin 7 I.L.M.. 1183 (1968). See also OPEC Res. XXIV. 135
(July 1971), reprinied M 10 I.L.M. 1082 (1971).
33. Rama-Montaldo, supra note 6, at 145-6.
34. OPEC STATUTE, supra note 18, art. 32.
35. Id. art. 11(c).
36. Id. art. 35.
37. Id. art. 36.
38. Id. art. 37.
39. Id. art. 38.
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tional legal personality as enunciated in the Reparation Case.
Therefore, OPEC possesses the attributes of an international per-
son, regardless of its treatment in the municipal law of any
nonmember.
II. IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
The existence of international legal personality, determined
under the inductive approach, is dependent upon the good will and
recognition of third-party States outside the forming members. If
international legal personality is not recognized by a third-party
State the organization has no rights or privileges within the munici-
pal law of the third-party State since the organization is not recog-
nized as a juridical person. Therefore, the organization cannot sue
and be sued in the courts of the nonrecognizing third-party State.
At present, the United States has not expressly recognized OPEC as
an international person. Therefore under the inductive approach
OPEC would not have access to United States federal courts.
On the other hand, if OPEC has international legal personality
under the objective approach, express recognition of the organiza-
tion as an international person is not necessary. Therefore, OPEC
would be entitled to sue and be sued within the United States. It
would also be entitled to all the privileges and immunities that are
necessary for the independent exercise of OPEC's functions. At the
same time, however, an international organization does not possess
all of the privileges and immunities accorded sovereigns, but only
those necessary to the performance of its functions. If a sovereign
would not be immune from suit neither would an international or-
ganization performing the same function or activity.
A soveriegn is immune from suit in the courts of the United
States as far as any political (lure imperil) act is concerned.4' How-
ever, if the activity is commercial in nature, the sovereign is not
granted immunity.4 Whether a sovereign engaged in the extrac-
40. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336
F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. den. 381 U.S. 934 (1965); Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, § 4(a), 28 U.S.C.§§ 1602-1611 (1976).
41. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976) [herein-
after cited as FSIA]. Passage of the FSIA represents an adoption by Congress of the restric-
tive theory of Sovereign immunity which was first stated as United States policy in the "Tate
Letter," 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952). Under the restrictive theory, sovereign immunity
is recognized only with respect to sovereign or public (political) acts but not with respect to
private (commercial) acts. Id. For a good commentary on the FSIA, see Brower, The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in Practice, 73 AM. J. INT'L. L. 200 (1979).
Vol. 12
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tion, refining, or marketing of oil is engaged in a political or com-
mercial activity is a purely subjective determination. 42 From the
point of view of the sovereign, whose entire economy virtually de-
pends on its oil reserves, any part of that industry would be consid-
ered political activity.
In International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v.
OPEC 43 based in part on United Nations resolutions' and the na-
ture of sovereignty, Judge Hank found that "[c]ontrol over their oil
resources is an especially sovereign function because oil, as their
primary, if not sole, revenue producing resource, is crucial to the
welfare of their nations' peoples. ' 45 Judge Hank's conclusion was
preordained by the characterization he gave to the activity in-
volved. A House Judiciary Committee Report of 1976 defined
"commerical activity" as any activity which is normally engaged in
by a private party, while an activity in which only a sovereign may
engage in is a political activity.' By characterizing the activity as
"the establishment by a sovereign state of the terms and conditions
for the removal of a prime natural resource-to wit, crude oil-
from its territory," 47 Judge Hank forced the conclusion that it was a
political activity. It is indeed true, as stated by Judge Hank, that
control over natural resources arises out of sovereignty over terri-
tory,48 and that the extraction of those natural resources may be
crucial to the welfare of the people of the State.49 However, the
"sovereign" nature that Judge Hank seeks to attribute to the extrac-
tion of natural resources diminishes when one considers the fact
that the freedom of a sovereign to dispose of its natural resources is
42. For a discussion of this issue see Lashbrooke, Vertical Integration and Restraints by
the Oil-Producing Sovereigns: Antitrust Implications and Supply Considerations, 13 N.Y.U.J.
INT'L L. & POL. 193, 205-09 (1980).
43. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists,supra note 4.
44. Declaration of Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17
U.N. GAOR SUPP. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Natural
Resources]. This resolution recognizes "the inalienable right of all States freely to dispose of
their national wealth and resources in accordance with their national interests, and ... respect
for the economic independence of States ..." See also G.A. Res. 1515, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 16) at 9, U.N. Doc. A/4648 (1960); G.A. Res. 1314, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at
27, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958).
45. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, supra note 4, at 568.
46. H. R. Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6604, 6615.
47. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, supra note 4, at 567.
48. Id. at 568.
49. Id.
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not unfettered. There are some rather severe limitations on this
power.
First, the terms and conditions for the disposal of natural re-
sources are limited to the territory of the sovereign. The univer-
sally accepted territorial principle permits a state to exercise its
legislative power only over its own territory.5" The prescribed ac-
tivity is legal within the territory of the legislating sovereign but
carries no extraterritorial validity. Moreover, what is legal in one
jurisdiction may well be illegal in another and may be actionable
under the extended territorial principle known as the "effects doc-
trine"'" which is generally applied to cases involving economic in-
terests. The criteria for the extraterritorial application ye! non of
the United States antitrust laws under the effects doctrine are set
out in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America.52 The defendant
must: (1) intend the act to have an effect within the United States;
and, (2) such an effect must actually occur within the United
States.53 Applying these two criteria to the OPEC case, it is clear
that the OPEC sovereigns intended that their price setting acts have
an extraterritorial effect. It is equally clear that the acts did have
extraterritorial effects although Judge Hank found that the plaintiff
failed to prove proximate cause by not being able to demonstrate
that the price increases were a substantial factor in the increased
prices of domestic gasoline.54 A final restriction is contained in the
very United Nation's resolution cited by Judge Hank in support of
his conclusion. The freedom to dispose of natural resources is lim-
ited by the sovereign's own national interests and respect for the
economic independence of other States.55 While extracting the
highest possible price for exhausting natural resources may be in
the national interest of the OPEC sovereigns, the increased petro-
leum prices brought industrialized society to the brink of economic
disaster. The very existence of the vast amount of petrodollars has
virtually destroyed the international monetary system and made
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 18, comment d, 20 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Restatement].
51. Id. Section 18 states in relevant part:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if...
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements
of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal
systems...(emphasis added).
52. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443-45 (2d Cir. 1945).
53. Id. at 444-45.
54. See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists supra note 4, at 574.
55. See Natural Resources, supra note 44, and accompying text.
Vol. 12
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world economic planning a guessing game. The existence of as
much as one trillion dollars in Eurocurrency has inundated the
Bretton Woods Agreements.56 This currency is stateless and be-
yond the control of any country to regulate. It contributes to infla-
tion, to shifts in balance of payments, and to the undermining of
national currencies. Certainly, the pricing practices of OPEC's
members interfered with the economic independence of other
States.
These limitations aside, the court's conclusion is further under-
mined by the fact that it discounted the legislative history of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 which clearly states thatmineral extraction is a commerical activity.57 While both the ex-
traction and disposition of crude oil may be considered political
activities by a sovereign, the sale of a service or product is a com-
mercial activity carried on for profit within the meaning of the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act.58 Marketing activities such as
setting the price of oil, public relations campaigns, and negotiating
other agreements with the major oil companies are without a doubt
commercial activities. OPEC does not extract or dispose of crude
oil since it does not own any oil. The individual sovereigns own the
oil. OPEC is a marketing and public relations operation. Since a
sovereign engaging in these activities would be engaged in commer-
cial activities and not be immune from suit, neither will an interna-
tional organization engaging in those activities be immune from
suit. As an international person, OPEC would not be immune from
suit as a matter of international law since such immunity is not
necessary to carry out its function. Neither would OPEC's constitu-
ent member sovereigns be immune from suit for engaging in the
same activities.
An international organization may, however, be immune from
suit if so provided by municipal ordinance. Section 2 of the Inter-
national Organization Immunities Act59 provides immunities and
privileges for certain international organizations.6" But, the immu-
56. The Bretton Woods Conference held in 1944 developed the financial institutions
and agreements for economic recovery and development including the International Mone-
tary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade.
57. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 6604, 6614-15.
58. Id.
59. 22 U.S.C. § 288a (1976).
60. Id. See also 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1976), which defines "international organization" to be
11
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nity from suit provided by this law is limited to that which would
be enjoyed by foreign governments. 61 Applying this language to
OPEC, even if the United States were to recognize OPEC as an
international organization for purposes of section 2, OPEC would
not be immune from suit because a foreign government engaged in
those same commercial activities would not be immune from suit.
In conclusion, under the objective approach, OPEC is an inter-
national person entitled to certain privileges and immunities. Im-
munity from suit in federal court cannot, however, be deemed
necessary to the performance of OPEC's functions, nor is such im-
munity provided for by federal statute.
III. JURISDICTION
A. Federal Case
OPEC may be a "juridical person" for purposes of interna-
tional law, but municipal statutes for the most part make no provi-
sion for international organizations in their respective definitional
sections. Within the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, a definition
of "person" can only be found in Section 7 of the Sherman Act62
and Section 1 of the Clayton Act.63 Both sections include in their
definition "corporations and associations existing under or author-
ized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the
Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign coun-
try." OPEC is an international organization within the interna-
tional community but does not exist "under or authorized by law"
except as the OPEC Statute exists in the laws of the creating States.
Notwithstanding this fact, it must be remembered that international
legal personality does not arise out of municipal law under the ob-
jective approach but only under the inductive approach. There-
fore, under the inductive approach, OPEC may be an association
which exists under the laws of a foreign country. OPEC certainly
exists in the municipal law of its member States. However, "per-
son" as defined in the Sherman and Clayton Acts is extremely
broad and could encompass an international organization although
a sovereign may not be a person within the meaning of the Sher-
a public international organization in which the United States participates pursuant to a
treaty, by Act of Congress, or designation by the President by executive order.
61. 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (1976).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1976).
63. 14 U.S.C. § 12 (1976).
Vol. 12
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man and Clayton Acts.' Judge Hank in International Machinists
held that a sovereign was not a person within the meaning of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts and could not be a defendant in an an-
titrust action. 65 He relied primarily on Parker v. Brown66 wherein
the Supreme Court stated: "The Sherman Act makes no mention
of the state as such, and gives no hint that it was intended to re-
strain state action or official action directed by a state."67 More-
over, after reviewing the legislative history, the Supreme Court
found the purpose of the Sherman and Clayton Acts to be the sup-
pression of combinations in restraint of trade and monopolization
by individuals and corporations. 68 This finding is not surprising
considering that the Sherman and Clayton Acts were enacted in
1890 and 1914, respectively. This was a time when absolute sover-
eign immunity was the norm and states of the federal union did not
engage in commercial activities. Later in this century sovereigns
began engaging in activities which previously had been solely in the
private sector as greater government participation in business was
demanded to establish orderly markets and prevent depressions
even to the extent of nationalization and government enterprises.
The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was not adopted in
the United States until 1952 in the "Tate Letter."'69 The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act clearly indicates that Congress has rec-
ognized that sovereigns do engage in commercial activities and
should not be immune from suit when they do so. To hold that a
sovereign cannot be a defendant in an antitrust action contradicts
the intent of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
Whatever sensitive foreign policy matters may dictate judicial
discretion with respect to allowing suit against a particular foreign
sovereign, they should not be considerations when dealing with an
international organization whose primary activity is commercial.
At present, the status of an international organization, which is
64. In Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. den., 434 U.S. 984
(1977), the Court of Appeals noted that the Libyan government could not have violated the
Sherman Act by allegedly conspiring against Hunt's oil concern because Libya "is not a
person or corporation within the terms of the Act but a sovereign state." Id. at 78 n. 14. But,
a foreign sovereign is a person for purposes of Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15,
(1976), and may bring suit to recover damages for violation of Antitrust law. Pfizer, Inc. v.
Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 318 (1978).
65. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, supra note 4, at 570-72.
66. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
67. Id. at 351.
68. Id.
69. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
I - 317
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somewhere between a sovereign State and an organization author-
ized by municipal law, is uncertain.
Other United States federal statutes are more restrictive. The
definition of "person" in Section 2(2) of the Securities Act of 193370
limits a person to "an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an
association, a joint stock company, a trust, any unincorporated or-
ganization, or a government or political subdivision thereof." For
purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a "person" is "a
natural person, company, government, or political subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality of a government."'" An international or-
ganization might be considered an "instrumentality" of its member
States under the inductive approach. Under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977, an OPEC official apparently may be bought
by a United States business since Congress did not consider inter-
national organizations within the scope of that Act. 72 Only govern-
ment officials, political parties, and political candidates are
included within the 1977 Act.73
As can be seen from this brief review of various United States
federal statutes, international organizations do not fit neatly into
the legal scheme envisioned by Congress. In this era of ever-in-
creasing international agencies, particularly when the motivation
for formation of the organization is economic rather than peace or
welfare, Congress should adjust its thinking with respect to what
constitutes a juridical person for purposes of United States statutes.
1. The Inductive Approach. Under the inductive approach to
international legal personality, OPEC is not a person under the mu-
nicipal law of the United States because it is neither a sovereign nor
a recognized international organization. It would have a character
similar to an unincorporated association within United States mu-
nicipal law. Suit would have to be maintained against the individ-
ual sovereign members of OPEC. Both the defenses of sovereign
immunity and act of state would be available to the individual
members. While sovereign immunity is a plea with respect to the
jurisdiction of the tribunal involved,74 the act of state doctrine is an
70. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2) (1976 & Supp. 1981).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(9) (1976 & Supp. 1981).
72. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 m, 78 dd-l, 78 dd-2, 78 ff
(1976).
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 dd-1, 78 dd-2 (1976).
74. Sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense which places the burden of proof to
Vol. 12
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affirmative defense to the action." Successful application of the act
of state doctrine, as is the case with sovereign immunity, depends
upon whether the activity is classified as political (lure imperdi) or
commercial lure gestionis).76 Prevailing in a suit against a sover-
eign does not mean, however, that there exists a satisfactory rem-
edy. Imprisonment, if authorized, of a foreign sovereign is out of
the question." A fine78 may be levied but is not practical. First, a
fine in the case of OPEC sovereigns would probably be de minimis
in comparison to oil revenues of these oil producing sovereigns.
Second, the United States could not compel another sovereign to
pay the fine. Third, even if the fine was substantial and were to be
paid, it would be passed on to consumers by way of higher prices.
A judgment for damages would present the same problems as im-
position of a fine. Injunction against future violation would also be
unenforceable against a foreign sovereign. Condemnation and
seizure of imported goods79 would be an unsatisfactory remedy if
the goods are a necessary part of the United States economy. Pe-
troleum products are vital parts of the United States economy. It
appears that winning the suit would be a hollow victory.
2. The Objective Approach. Under the objective approach to
international legal personality, OPEC is an international person
and subject to suit in federal court since it is not immune under
United States municipal law. OPEC can be sued in federal court if
jurisdiction can be obtained. Personal service of process would
have to be made on the OPEC Secretary General as the legally
authorized representative of OPEC."0 The headquarters of OPEC
establish immunity on the foreign sovereign. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6616.
75. See e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); Hunt v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. den., 434 U.S. 984 (1977); Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
76. Victory Transport v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354, 358 (2nd Cir. 1964).
77. For Example, imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years is authorized on
conviction for a violation of the Sherman Act. A sentence of at least three months but not
more than one year is authorized on conviction for a violation of the Wilson Tariff Act of
1894. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1,2,8 (1976).
78. A fine up to the statutory limit of $100,000 on conviction for violation of the Sher-
man Act or a fine of between $100 and $5,000 for violation of the Wilson Tariff Act of 1894
could be imposed. Id.
79. Condemnation and seizure of imported goods is authorized under the Wilson Tariff
Act of 1894. 15 U.S.C. § 11 (1976).
80. OPEC STATUTE, spra note 18, art. 27.
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is located in Austria.81 Rule 4(f)82 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure only provides for effective service of process within the
territorial limits of the state in which the district court is located or
when a statute of the United States provides for service beyond the
territorial limits of that state. Personal service on OPEC is not pos-
sible under Rule 4(f) unless the federal statute provides for extra-
territorial service.
In the 1979 case, International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, suit was attempted against OPEC in
federal district court in California for violation of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts.83 The court found that OPEC could not be served
because: (1) under the provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act of 197684 OPEC was not a sovereign state; (2) under the
International Immunities Act85 the United States does not partici-
pate in OPEC; and, (3) an executive order has not been issued
granting OPEC international organization status. 86 Consequently,
OPEC was dismissed from the suit by the court. 87
Section 5 of the Sherman Act8 8 and Section 15 of the Clayton
Act 89 authorize extraterritorial service only for suits brought by the
government. In an antitrust suit brought by a private party there is
no authorization under United States antitrust laws for service of
process outside of the state in which the district court is located.90
However, service may be made on a corporate defendant in an anti-
trust suit outside the state where the district court is located.91 But,
OPEC is an international organization and not a corporation.
Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also applies
to third party practice. 92 It would not be possible to bring suit
81. See Headquarters Agreement, supra note 22.
82. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(0.
83. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, supra note 4. The Complaint alleged that OPEC and its
members fixed the price of crude oil and that this constituted a per se violation of the anti-
trust laws.
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
85. 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1976).
86. 477 F. Supp. 560 (D.C. Cal. 1979).
87. Id.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1976).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976).
90. Orange Theatre Corp. v. Rayberstz Amusement Corp., 7 F.R. Serv. 12b.23, Case 4;
139 F.2d 871, 874-75 (3d Cir. 1944); Rohlfing v. Cat's Paw Rubber Co., Inc., 15 F.R. Serv.
4f.22, Case 23; 99 F. Supp. 886, 892-93 (N.D. I11. 1951).
91. Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976). Abrams v. Bendix Home
Appliances, Inc., 14 F.R. Serv. 4f.22, Case 4, 92 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y.) (1950).
92. F & M Skirt Co., Inc. v. Wimpfheimer & Bro., Inc., 1 F.R. Serv. 4f.22, Case 1; 27 F.
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against a United States based oil company for violation of the anti-
trust acts and have the oil company join OPEC as a necessary third
party. In the absence of any provision for extraterritorial service of
process in an antitrust action OPEC cannot be validly served.
Some federal statutes such as the Securities Act of 193393 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 193494 provide for worldwide serv-
ice of the process.95 Service would be obtained by complying with
the Hague Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extraju-
dicial Documents.96 The Court would transmit the documents to
the central authority designated97 by the receiving State. The cen-
tral authority will then serve the documents itself or arrange for the
appropriate agency to do so 98 and then provide a return of service
document. 99 If the request for service complies with the terms of
the Hague Convention, the receiving State may not refuse to com-
ply unless compliance would infringe upon its sovereignty or secur-
ity."° The receiving State may not refuse even if under its
municipal law subject matter jurisdiction would be exclusive in that
State or if its municipal law would not permit such an action within
that State.' 0 ' To obtain service of process on OPEC the documents
would be forwarded to the central authority designated by Austria
for service and return on the OPEC Secretary General at OPEC
Headquarters.
10 2
Supp. 239 (D. MASS. 1939); Miller v. Hano v. Kennedy, 11 F.R. Serv. 4f.22, Case 1; 8
F.R.D. 67 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
93. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 and Supp. 1981).
95. "...process in such cases [violations of the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934] may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an
inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found." 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v, 77aa (1976).
96. CONVENTION ON THE SERVICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL Docu-
MENTS IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS, openedfor signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T.
361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 (mforce Feb. 10, 1969) [hereinafter cited as HAGUE
CONVENTION].
97. Each signatory State shall designate a central authority to receive requests for serv-
ice from other signatory States. Id. art. 2.
98. Id. art. 5.
99. Id. art. 6.
100. Id. art. 13.
101. Id.
102. Austria is a party to the HAGUE CONVENTION pursuant to art. 22, 20 U.S.T. 366, 658
U.N.T.S. 177, which provides that the HAGUE CONVErTION replaces arts. 1-7 of the Conven-
tion Relating to Civil Procedure, March 1, 1954, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Re-
public of Germany, Finland, etc., 286 U.N.T.S. 265.
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B. Diversity Case
Obtaining jurisdiction over an international organization
under diversity jurisdiction would be more difficult than under a
federal statute. The diversity statute 10 3 does not recognize interna-
tional persons other than sovereigns.01° An international organiza-
tion is not a citizen or subject of a foreign state. Rather, an
international organization is an international person. The United
Nations is not a United States citizen merely because its headquar-
ters is located in New York City. Likewise, OPEC is not an Aus-
trian citizen simply because its headquarters are located in Austria.
It would appear that suit would have to be brought against the indi-
vidual members of the organization to obtain diversity jurisdiction,
much the same way that unincorporated associations are treated in
diversity practice. An unicorporated association is not a juridical
person for purposes of diversity jurisdiction even when it has the
capacity to sue and be sued in its own name. 0 5 Suit must be
brought against the membership. 106
The problem of personality aside, Rule 4(f) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure applies to diversity suits as well as federal
cases. 107 Service under a state statute outside of the state in which
the district court is located is also ineffective.' 08 The only alterna-
tive left is in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction. Personal service may
be obtained on a nonresident defendant outside the state where the
district court is located if property of the nonresident defendant was
attached in a state court action and the case is subsequently re-
moved to federal court by another defendant."° However, the via-
bility of certain types of in rem or quasi in rem cases is questionable
if not nonexistant after the case Shaffer v. Heitner.' ° Cases in
which the property only serves as a basis for state court jurisdiction
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976).
104. Id The federal court jurisdiction with respect to persons is limited to controversies
between: "(1) citizens of different states; (2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens
or subjects thereof; and, (3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states or citizens
or subjects thereof are additional parties."
105. Calagaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248, 251-52 (5th Cir. 1962).
106. Ex Parte Edelstein, 30 F.2d 636, (2d Cir.), cert. den., 279 U.S. 851 (1929).
107. Wallach v, Shumacher, 15 F.R. Serv. 4f.22, Case 2; 11 F.R.D. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
See supra text accompanying notes 84 & 92.
108. Barnhart v. John B. Rogers Producing Co., 13 F.R. Serv. 4.22, Case 7; 9 F.R.D. 590
(V.D. Pa. 1950).
109. Reiber v. Trailmobile Co., 16 F.R. Serv. 64.22, Case 1, 11 F.R.D. 431 (w.D. Mo.
1951).
110. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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and is otherwise not related to the cause of action are no longer
constitutional. ' '
The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause "does not contem-
plate that a state may make binding a judgment. . .against an indi-
vidual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts,
ties, or relations.""..2 The minimum-contacts standard enunciated
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,' 3 is the standard for de-
termining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the interests of
persons is constitutional." 4 In view of Shaffer, attachment of the
property of an international organization solely for the purpose of
acquiring jurisdiction is out of the question. Moreover, an interna-
tional organization such as OPEC has no assets in the United
States. All of the petroleum and petroleum products which were
initially owned by the oil producing members as sovereigns have
been sold to the oil companies before reaching the United States.
OPEC itself never has title to the petroleum or petroleum products.
Proceeds from the sale of the petroleum and petroleum products
belong to the sovereigns and not OPEC. OPEC's primary assets are
its headquarters facilities and special fund. At least in the case of
OPEC, attachment would be fruitless.
IV. CONCLUSION
Under either the inductive approach or the objective ap-
proach, OPEC has international legal personality, although the
consequences of that assertion vary with the approach utilized. As
an international person OPEC may sue and be sued in the United
States federal courts. OPEC is not immune from suit either by stat-
ute, executive order, or customary international law because OPEC
is engaged in commercial activities. Acquiring jurisdiction over an
international organization is extremely difficult if not impossible
unless jurisdiction is acquiesed in by the organization or unless a
federal statute provides for extraterritorial service of process. Mere
acquiesence by the international organization may not be enough
because Congress, in the enactment of many federal statutes, did
not contemplate the inclusion of international organizations within
the definition of a "person."
The ultimate question is whether the federal courts would en-
111. Id. at 208-09.
112. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
113. Id.
114. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977).
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tertain a suit against an international organization, even where suit
is authorized by statute, except in ordinary cases involving con-
tracts or torts. "Where delicate, complex issues of international ec-
onomic policy are involved, jurisdiction [of a case involving an
international organization] should be denied.""'  This situation is
particularly true with respect to OPEC. Not only is the United
States heavily dependent upon the importation of foreign oil, "16 but
the peace negotiations in the Middle East, where major OPEC
members are located, are delicate and complex. The federal courts
will probably defer to the executive branch on questions of interna-
tional economic policy.
115. Lutcher S.A. Celulose E Papel Candoi, Parana, Brazil, v. Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, 253 F. Supp. 568, 570, afl'd, 382 F.2d 454 (D.C. Cir. 1966), 127 U.S. App. D.C.
238.
116. In 1979, approximately forty-three per cent of the crude oil consumed in the United
States was imported. Cook, OPEC Is Springing.lnother Trap, Forbes, Oct. 29, 1979, at 30.
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